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Abstract—In this paper, we study a Day-ahead Market(DAM) 
double energy auction in a distribution system involving 
dispatchable generation units, renewable generation units 
supported by battery storage systems(BSSs), fixed loads, price 
responsive loads, and supply from the Wholesale Market(WSM) 
at Locational Marginal Price (LMP). The auction is implemented 
within a Distribution System Operator (DSO) premises using 
Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP). The proposed 
auction is cleared at the Distribution LMP (DLMP) and is 
observed to be weakly budget balanced if no penalty is applied for 
DSO’s deviation from its original commitment with the WSM. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of DLMP versus LMP, and their effect 
on distribution market participants scheduled quantities as well as 
the WSM supply to the distribution system is investigated.  
 
Keywords—distribution system operation; auction; budget 
balance; bid; social welfare 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
Indices: 
 
𝑚    Distribution bus index                   
𝑔    Generation unit index                    
𝑏    BSS unit index  
𝑙    Load index                 
𝑞    Generation segments index   
𝑟    Load segments index         
𝑡    Timeslot index 
 
Sets: 
 
ℳ   Set of distribution buses 
𝒢     Set of generation units 
ℬ     Set of BSS units 
ℒ     Set of price responsive loads 
𝒯     Set of time slots 
 
Functions: 
 
𝑓      Objective function indicating social welfare 
𝜙  Deviation from commitment penalty function 
 
Variables: 
 
px    Segment generation 
p      Generation unit output  
e      BSS unit energy output 
s      Supply from WSM 
dx    Segment load  
d      Total demand of load  
c      BSS unit state of charge  
 
Binary and Integer Variables: 
 
𝑖         Commitment state of generation unit  
𝑗         Commitment state of BSS unit  
𝑦        Startup indicator of generation unit  
𝑧        Shut down indicator of generation unit 
𝑠𝑑      Shut down counter for generation unit  
𝑠𝑢      Start up counter for generation unit 
𝑢        BSS unit charging indicator  
𝑣        BSS unit discharging indicator  
𝑐𝑐       Charging counter for BSS unit 
𝑑𝑐      Discharging counter for BSS unit 
                                                                                                                         
Parameters: 
 
S            Total fixed supply allocated by the ISO to DSO  
PXmax     Maximum segment generation in each segment  
Pmin       Minimum generation of a generation unit 
Pmax      Maximum generation of a generation unit 
CB           Selling cost of BSS unit energy  
CG           Selling cost of generation unit energy  
CL            Buying cost of load  
STC        Start-up cost of a generation unit 
SDC       Shut down cost of a generation unit 
RU          Rump up rate of a generation unit 
RD          Rump down rate a generation unit 
MDTG    Minimum down time of a generation unit 
MUTG    Minimum up time of a generation unit 
MDTB    Minimum discharge time of a BSS unit  
MCTB     Minimum charge time of a BSS unit 
Emin       Minimum BSS unit energy withdraw amount 
Emax       Maximum BSS unit energy withdraw amount 
Cmin       Minimum state of charge of BSS unit 
Cmax       Maximum state of charge of BSS unit 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The study of market design for distribution system operator 
(DSO) has recently gained a considerable research momentum 
due to inclusion of different market participants such as 
Renewable Energy Resource (RES) owners, Battery Storage 
System (BSS) owners, and load aggregators in the smart grid. 
As an intermediate market operator, the DSO may use 
forecasted and (or) historical load and system distributed 
generation (DG) data to bid in the WSM.  The independent 
system operator (ISO) clears WSM and announces the DSO’s 
LMP and scheduled amount. In such a situation, the DSO may 
implement a DAM auction in its own service territory to seek 
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further efficient resource allocation and maximize social 
welfare. The service area under the control of the DSO can be 
comprised of various loads and generation units.  The 
generation units in the network can be of dispatchable and non-
dispatchable kind. Non-dispatchable units that are mainly 
renewable energy resource such as wind and solar are 
intermittent and causes uncertainty while weakening the 
classical demand price correlation [1], [2]. However, these 
restrictions can be alleviated by channeling their output power 
through BSSs [3], [4].   
While distinctive models for DSO are proposed by various 
researchers in the electricity market [5] − [8], a broader model 
that can handle involvement of all kinds of market participants 
has not yet been developed. Distribution market clearing and 
payment mechanisms are still open questions that are yet to be 
answered with viable and sound assumptions.  
Seen hierarchically, the distribution system service territory 
starts at the bus where the utility company can bid in the WSM 
through a DSO. In many cases, a sub-transmission network then 
distributes the power to different distribution buses (D-buses), 
i.e. substations [5]. Each D-bus serves smaller substations at 
medium voltage that may cover a small geographic area or a 
community of houses at low voltage. In the low voltage 
distribution system, different aggregator models have been 
proposed in the literature that may be incentivized to aggregate 
classical fixed as well as price responsive loads and bid in the 
distribution market [9] − [12].   
This paper proposes a DAM model for DSO given the LMP 
and its commitment post-WSM or based on forecasted or 
historical data. The goal of the DSO is to implement a double 
auction in order to maximize the social welfare of the market 
participants such as distribution level generation units, BSS 
units, and price responsive loads through aggregators.   
II. MODEL 
In the proposed model when the DSO receives its committed 
energy information at LMP from the ISO, it asks for bids from 
generation units, BSSs, and load aggregators in the distribution 
system. Generation units are assumed to submit a three-segment 
bid and amount as well as their ramp up/down rates and 
startup/shut down costs. Load aggregators are assumed capable 
of dividing their aggregated load to a fixed load segment 
amount that needs to be served at all times and a two-segment 
price responsive bid and amount. The fixed segment of the 
loads are served at the market-clearing price and do not 
accompany any monetary bid amount. This is because not all 
loads are price responsive, i.e. a high portion of the load is price 
inelastic and needs to be served at all times. It is assumed that 
renewable energy resources at the distribution level are coupled 
with BSS units for a smooth participation in the auction, and 
declare their selling price as well as their unit characteristics to 
the DSO for optimal operation. BSS units have the potential to 
help integrate deeper penetrations of renewable energy into 
electricity grids and deliver efficient, low-cost, fundamental 
electricity-grid services [3]. It is considered in this paper that 
the BSS units are backed up and charged only by its own 
renewable energy resource(s). The proposed model can be 
easily extended for idle BSS units that can also be charged or 
discharged by the grid. 
Equipped with the aforementioned considerations, the DSO 
runs the auction and clears the market by providing power to 
the successful biding parties at the DLMP. The concept of 
DLMP has been proposed by many researchers for distribution 
system congestion management, market clearing, and loss 
minimization [2], [6], [13] − [15], [18], as it shows the true 
marginal cost of supplying the next increment of load.  
Although in this study the distribution line congestion has not 
been taken into account, the true value of a unit of energy at the 
D-buses are different from that of the DSO bus. This is because 
bids of the market participants at each D-bus is different, 
resulting to different DLMPs. The DLMPs are attained by the 
Lagrange multiplier of the supply-demand balance constraint of 
each D-bus. The current model can be easily extended to 
include line congestion constraints using shift factors or Power 
Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) using DC power flow, a 
viable approximation at the sub-transmission level of the 
distribution system. Furthermore, one can also use the 
simplified DistFlow equations [19], [20] to model line 
congestion as well as D-bus voltage limit constraints.  
  Fig. 1 depicts a sample distribution system architecture with 
four D-buses fed by sub-transmission lines from the main DSO 
bus in a radial configuration. Each D-bus is considered to 
include dispatchable generation units (denoted by G), BSS units 
charged by renewable resources (denoted by B) and several 
aggregated loads (denoted by L). After WSM clearing of DAM, 
or by means of forecasting or historical data, the DSO knows 
the committed supply S𝑡   and LMP of the WSM and runs a 
day−ahead auction to determine its own unit commitment and 
supply distribution while maximizing the overall system social 
welfare.  
The social welfare maximization of the system can be 
modeled as in Eqn. (1) subject to system constraints in Eqns. 
(2) − (30).  
 
Maximize 𝑓: 
 
𝑓 = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ CL𝑚𝑙𝑟𝑡 dx𝑚𝑙𝑟𝑡 
𝑟>1𝑙𝑚𝑡
− ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ CG𝑚𝑔𝑞 px𝑚𝑔𝑞𝑡 
𝑞𝑔𝑚𝑡
 
    − ∑ ∑ ∑ STC𝑚𝑔𝑦𝑚𝑔𝑡
𝑔
− ∑ ∑ ∑ SDC𝑚𝑔𝑧𝑚𝑔𝑡
𝑔𝑚𝑡𝑚𝑡
 
Fig. 1. System architecture with four distribution buses   
  
    − ∑ ∑ ∑ CB𝑚𝑏 e𝑚𝑏𝑡
𝑏𝑚𝑡
− ∑ ∑ LMP𝑡 smt
𝑚𝑡
(1) 
subject to the following constraints ∀ 𝑚𝜖ℳ, ∀ 𝑔𝜖𝒢,
∀ 𝑏𝜖ℬ, ∀ 𝑙𝜖ℒ, ∀ 𝑡𝜖𝒯  :                                               
     
∑ s𝑚𝑡𝑚 ≤ S𝑡                                                                  ∀𝑡 (2)  
∑ p𝑚𝑔𝑡𝑔 + ∑ e𝑚𝑏𝑡 +𝑏 s𝑚𝑡 = ∑ d𝑚𝑙𝑡𝑙              ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (3)  
     The first term in the RHS of Eqn. (1) pertains to the price 
responsive loads and allocates to loads with highest bids. Note 
that, as the loads are assumed to submit their fixed load segment 
without and two price responsive segments with monetary bids, 
the fixed segment is excluded from the first term, i.e. 𝑟 > 1. The 
second, third, and fourth terms relate to generation units and 
allocates to those that have bid the least and incur smaller start 
up and shut down costs. The fifth term is modeled to pick BSS 
units with lowest bids and the sixth term decides the optimum 
amount of supply to each D-bus. The objective function in Eqn. 
(1) picks energy sellers with least marginal cost and energy 
buyers with highest valuation in order to maximize surplus and 
result an efficient allocation [10].     
Eqn. (2) indicates that the sum of supplies channeled through 
the DSO into each D-bus shall not exceed the committed 
schedule to the ISO. Similarly, Eqn. (3) ensures that the demand 
of each individual D-bus is supplied by the allocated portion of 
supply from WSM, and the supply of the generation and BSS 
units in that bus. 
    
d𝑚𝑙𝑡   =  ∑ dx𝑚𝑙𝑟𝑡𝑟                                            ∀𝑙, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (4) 
0 ≤ dx𝑚𝑙𝑟𝑡 ≤ DX𝑚𝑙𝑟
max                                  ∀𝑟, ∀𝑙, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (5) 
D𝑚𝑙
min ≤ d𝑚𝑙𝑡 ≤ D𝑚𝑙
max                                        ∀𝑙, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (6) 
p𝑚𝑔𝑡 =  ∑ p𝑚𝑔𝑞𝑡𝑞                                            ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (7)  
0 ≤ p𝑚𝑔𝑞𝑡 ≤ PX𝑚𝑔𝑞
max                                 ∀𝑞, ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (8) 
P𝑚𝑔
min 𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≤ p𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≤ P𝑚𝑔
max 𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑡                    ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (9) 
Eqn. (4) shows that the total demand of a load is equal to the 
demand of the fixed segment ( 𝑟 = 1 ) plus the demand of its 
responsive segments ( 𝑟 > 1 ). Eqn. (5) and (6) indicates the 
segment limits and total demand limits of each load. Eqn.  (7), 
signifies that power generated by a generation unit is equal to 
the aggregated segment generation of that unit.  Eqn. (8) assures 
that the power generated at each segment by a generation unit 
does not violate the predefined lower and upper limits of 
generation in that segment. If committed, the total power 
generated by a dispatchable unit shall lie within its lower and 
upper generation limits, as indicated by Eqn. (9). 
         
p𝑚𝑔𝑡 − p𝑚𝑔(𝑡−1) ≤ RU𝑚𝑔                          ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (10) 
p𝑚𝑔(𝑡−1) − p𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≤ RD𝑚𝑔                        ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (11) 
0 ≤ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≤ |𝒯| 𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑡                                ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (12) 
(|𝒯| + 1)𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑡 − |𝒯| ≤ 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑔𝑡 − 𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑔, 𝑡−1                
 ≤ 1  ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (13)
 
𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≥ MUTG𝑚𝑔 𝑧𝑚𝑔,𝑡+1                       ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (14) 
0 ≤ 𝑠𝑑𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≤ |𝒯| (1 − 𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑡)                     ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (15)   
1 − (|𝒯| + 1)𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≤ 𝑠𝑑𝑚𝑔𝑡 − 𝑠𝑑𝑚𝑔,  𝑡−1 ≤ 1            
                                                                          ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (16)
 
𝑠𝑑𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≥ MDTG𝑚𝑔 𝑦𝑚𝑔,𝑡+1                        ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (17) 
𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑡 − 𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑡−1 = 𝑦𝑚𝑔𝑡 − 𝑧𝑚𝑔𝑡                   ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (18) 
𝑦𝑚𝑔𝑡 + 𝑧𝑚𝑔𝑡 ≤ 1                                          ∀𝑔, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (19) 
The ramp up/down constraints of each individual generation 
unit is ensured by Eqns. (10) and (11). In the same way, Eqns. 
(12) – (19) shows the MILP formulation for minimum uptime 
and minimum down time constraints of the generation units.  
 
Emin𝑗𝑚𝑏𝑡 ≤ e𝑚𝑏𝑡 ≤ E
max𝑗𝑚𝑏𝑡                    ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (20) 
Cmin ≤ c𝑚𝑏𝑡 ≤ C
max                                   ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (21) 
c𝑚𝑏𝑡 = c𝑚𝑏(𝑡−1) − e𝑚𝑏𝑡                              ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (22) 
0 ≤ 𝑑𝑐𝑚𝑏𝑡 ≤ |𝒯| 𝑗𝑚𝑏𝑡                                  ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (23) 
(|𝒯| + 1)𝑗𝑚𝑏𝑡 − |𝒯| ≤ 𝑑𝑐𝑚𝑏𝑡 − 𝑑𝑐𝑚𝑏,𝑡−1 ≤ 1         
                                                                         ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (24)
   
𝑑𝑐𝑚𝑏𝑡 ≥ MDT𝐵𝑚𝑏𝑢𝑚𝑏,𝑡+1                        ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (25) 
0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑏𝑡 ≤ |𝒯| (1 − 𝑗𝑚𝑏𝑡)                     ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (26) 
1 − (|𝒯| + 1)𝑗𝑚𝑏𝑡 ≤ 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑏𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑏,𝑡−1 ≤ 1              
                                                                         ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (27)
 
𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑏𝑡 ≥ MDT𝐵𝑚𝑏𝑣𝑚𝑏,𝑡+1                        ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (28) 
𝑗𝑚𝑏𝑡 − 𝑗𝑚𝑏𝑡−1 = 𝑣𝑚𝑏𝑡 − 𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑡                  ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (29) 
𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑡 + 𝑣𝑚𝑏𝑡  ≤ 1                                       ∀𝑏, ∀𝑚, ∀𝑡 (30) 
In order to increase the life expectancy of the BSS units, 
minimum and maximum amount of energy withdrawal from 
these units are bounded by the given limits in Eqn. (20). 
Likewise, Eqn. (21) keeps the BSS safe from overcharging and 
deep discharging. Eqn. (22) indicates the BSS units’ charging 
state update. Consecutive minimum discharging and charging 
hours’ constraints of BSS units are represented by Eqns.  (23) - 
(30).                               
III. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The tabulated data in this section pertains to market 
participants bidding information and serves as basis for the 
simulation reported.   Table I. shows each BSS units’ bidding 
information submitted to the DSO.  The bidding information for 
each generation unit is summarized in Table II and the hourly 
WSM supply and LMP is shown in Table III. Loads’ bidding 
information are not included due to space limitations as load 
bids were assumed to vary over timeslots. 
The MILP model presented in Eqns. (1) - (30) is coded in 
GAMS and solved using CPLEX solver for 24-hour horizon. 
The simulation results reported corroborate the validity of the 
proposed model. Several sets of analysis were conducted to see 
the effect of LMP on the auction outcome. Simulation results 
indicates that loads, generation and BSS units are very 
responsive to changes in LMP at the DSO bus at a given amount 
of supply by the WSM. At low LMPs, more from the WSM is 
  
allocated to loads due to high local generation bids. As the LMP 
increases, more internal generation at each D-bus is scheduled. 
A similar effect is observed on serving the price responsive 
loads. 
 
 
Bus Unit 
(Cmin, 
Cmax) 
(MWh) 
(Emin, 
Emax] 
(MWh/ hr) 
(MDTB, 
MCTB) 
(hr) 
CB 
 ($/MWh) 
1 BSS1 (1 – 10) (0.4 – 2) (3 – 6) 35 
2 BSS1 (1 – 8) (0.4 – 2) (3 – 6) 33 
2 BSS2 (1 – 10) (0.4 – 2) (3 – 6) 36.5 
4 BSS1 (1 – 8) (0.4 – 2) (2 – 6) 34 
 
 
 
(Bus, 
Unit) 
(PX1
max, 
CX1) 
(MW,$) 
(PX2
max, 
CX2) 
(MW,$) 
(PX3
max, 
CX3) 
(MW,$) 
(RU, 
RD) 
(MW/h) 
(STC, 
SDC 
($) 
(1,G1) (1.5, 36.7) (2.5, 39.3) (1, 42) (2.5, 2.5) (75, 60) 
(1,G2) (1.6, 34.8) (2, 37.8) (1.4, 40.5) (2.5, 2.5) (60, 60) 
(2,G1) (1.5, 30) (1.7, 33) (1.8, 39) (2.5, 2.5) (45, 54) 
(2,G2) (1.4, 36.9) (1.8,39.6) (1.8,43.8) (2.5, 2.5) (51, 45) 
(2,G3) (1, 34.5) (1.5, 36) (0.5, 39.6) (3, 3) (84, 45) 
(3,G1) (1.2, 29.4) (1.8, 30.6) (2, 34.5) (2.5, 2.5) (0, 0) 
(3,G2) (1.8, 32.1) (1.45, 32.6) (1.75, 34.5) (2.5, 2.5) (45, 51) 
(3,G3) (0.8, 35.7) (1.7, 37.5) (0.5, 40.5) (3, 3) (60, 48) 
(3,G4) (0.95, 36.3) (1.1, 37.5) (0.95, 40.5) (3, 3) (0 ,0) 
(4,G1) (1.9, 37.5) (1.7, 41.4) (1.4, 44.5) (2.5, 2.5) (10, 10) 
 
 
 
                  LMP and ISO supply in 24hr scheduling horizon 
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 
LMP 22.07 24.83 24.83 23.45 24.83 24.83 
𝐒𝒕 29.04 32.67 32.67 30.855 32.67 32.67 
t 7 8 9 10 11 12 
LMP 26.21 27.59 28.97 30.35 33.11 30.35 
𝐒𝒕 34.485 36.3 38.115 39.93 43.56 39.93 
t 13 14 15 16 17 18 
LMP 27.59 26.21 26.48 25.38 27.04 30.35 
𝐒𝒕 36.3 34.485 34.848 33.396 35.574 39.93 
t 19 20 21 22 23 24 
LMP 31.73 34.49 31.73 28.97 26.21 23.45 
𝐒𝒕 41.475 45.375 41.745 38.115 34.485 30.855 
 
Fig. 2 depicts LMP versus DSO’s supply allocation to each D-
bus as a portion of the total committed schedule that it receives 
from WSM during 24h scheduling horizon.  Notice that supply 
to each D-bus is very responsive to the changes in LMP.  When 
LMP is low, more power is allocated to flow from the WSM. 
However, during high LMP hours the power flow from DSO 
drops significantly, to the extent that D-bus number three feeds 
power back into the distribution network, i.e. to other D-buses. 
This is because D-bus 3 has more cheap generation and loads 
in other D-buses are ready to purchase at higher price than that 
of its own local loads.   
Fig. 3 shows LMP versus each D-bus’s internal generation. 
The internal generation at each D-bus increases with increase 
in LMP. Fig. 4 shows total power demand equals the total 
supply, which consists of supply from the WSM, internal 
generation, and supply from BSS units. Notice that the BSS 
units are scheduled only during peak LMP hours for at least 
three consecutive hours due to their minimum discharging time 
constraints.   
TABLE I. Bidding information of each BSS unit at each D-bus  
TABLE II. Segment generation and unit price for each D-bus  
TABLE III. Supply at the DSO bus from the ISO at the LMP 
Fig. 2. Hourly DSO supply to each D-bus vs. LMP    
Fig. 3. Hourly D-bus generation vs. LMP  
Fig. 4. Total demand and supply by the DSO, BSSs and generators     
Fig. 5. Supply from BSSs as DLMP changes   
Fig. 6. Supply from BSS units at two different DLMPs  
  
Fig. 5 depicts the LMP values versus BSS units’ commitment 
considering its charging/discharging limits. All BSS units are 
set to 6 hours of minimum charging and three minimum 
discharging hours except the minimum discharge time of BSS 
at D-bus 4, which is set to 2 hours. Note that this plot meets all 
the requirements set in the constraints in Eqns. (20) – (30). BSS 
units are scheduled during high price hours with more power 
scheduled at peak LMPs than its neighboring hours. In addition, 
the sum of assigned energy during scheduling horizon does not 
exceed each BSS unit’s capacity.  The plot in Fig.6 shows 
scheduled behavior of the second BSS unit at D-bus 2 for two 
different DLMPs along with its declared selling price depicted 
with the horizontal line. As seen, the BSS is only scheduled 
when DLMP is higher than its bid. Furthermore, the scheduled 
amount of power withdrawal from this BSS is higher where the 
difference between its bid and the DLMP is higher. A similar 
observation was made when generation units’ schedules were 
investigated. 
In order to study the dynamics of DLMP versus LMP, Figs. 
7 and 8 were plotted. Fig.7 shows the change in DLMP during 
the scheduling horizon for two different sets of LMPs. When 
LMP is low compared to the bids of loads, generation, and BSS 
units, DLMP deviates significantly and becomes higher than 
LMP. In the case when LMP increases, the DLMP also 
increases and overlaps with LMP in most hours. Note that 
further increase in LMP causes DLMP to equal LMP in all 
hours. This is because at LMPs higher than the generation units’ 
bids, all generation units are scheduled to serve the fixed and or 
price responsive loads, and serving any extra MWhr incurs a 
cost equal to LMP. Fig.8 illustrates this concept further by 
showing the 24-h LMP average for 10 scenarios while 
increasing LMP by a fixed percentage at each scenario. As 
expected, at low LMPs the entire committed supply of the 
WSM is injected into the D-buses, whereas lower amounts are 
drawn when LMP increases.  
The simulation results reported here assumes that no penalty 
is incurred for any deviation from what is committed to ISO. 
The DSO’s objective function in Eqn. (1) can be modified by 
adding a linear penalty function 𝜙(𝛾) to account for penalty 
incurred due to any deviation from original commitment.  
𝜙(𝛾) = −𝛾 (∑  St
𝑡
− ∑ ∑  smt
𝑚𝑡
) (31) 
To show the effect of applying penalty, the total deviation over 
the scheduling horizon from original commitment was plotted 
as a function of  𝛾 in Fig.9 for three different LMPs. Notice that 
for higher LMPs, a higher penalty is required to make the 
deviation zero. This means that if LMP is high, more internal 
generation and BSS units are scheduled, and it takes a higher 
penalty to force power injection from the WSM in order to 
make the deviation zero.  
Fig. 10 depicts the budget dynamics of the 10 increasing 
LMP scenarios for a fixed commitment S𝑡 from WSM when no 
penalty for deviation is applied, i.e. 𝛾 = 0. At lower LMPs, 
during scenarios one to five, the DSO makes money. It sells 
energy at higher DLMP while buying it at lower LMP.  As the 
LMP is increased further, less power is purchased from the 
WSM and DLMP approaches LMP. As a result, the DSO’s 
revenue drops down to zero after the fifth scenario. Note that, 
if DSO is penalized for deviation, it loses a monetary amount 
equal to 𝜙(𝛾) given by Eqn. (31). This is because deviation 
occurs at higher LMPs, i.e. after scenario five, when DSO’s 
revenue is zero with no penalty(𝛾 = 0). In such scenarios, the 
DSO has to bear the deviation cost 𝜙(𝛾). 
Fig. 7. LMP versus DLMP for 24-hour horizon  
Fig. 8. Average LMP vs DLMP and total supply to DSO    
Fig. 10. Payments and reimbursements   
Fig. 9. Deviation from ISO supply vs penalty for three different LMPs, 
with  LMP1(t)  <  LMP 2(t)  <  LMP 3(t)  
  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the distribution system operator’s DAM auction 
in the presence of distribution level generation units, renewable 
energy resources coupled with BSS units, and loads with fixed 
and price responsive segments has been modeled and studied. 
The DSO is considered to have the knowledge of its supply 
amount at LMP from the WSM. The DSO uses MILP to 
optimally schedule its available resources and maximize the 
social welfare. By clearing the auction at DLMP, the dynamics 
of DLMP versus LMP and their effect on the outcome of the 
auction as well as the resulting payments were studied.  
Simulation results show that, if DSO is not penalized for 
deviating from its committed schedule with the WSM, the 
auction is always weakly budget balanced. The DSO only 
makes money when LMP is cheaper at a given fixed supply 
from the WSM.  
Future studies can be carried out to model the auction in an 
iterative and distributed manner [16], [17]. The authors are 
working on establishing DLMPs locally using a lower level 
auction at each D-bus by achieving general market equilibrium 
conditions. Inclusion of distribution system physical constraints 
such as bus voltages, lines flow, and transformers capacity 
constraints in a distributed manner within a decentralized 
version of the proposed auction framework can be another 
interesting line of research.  
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